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INTRODUCTION 
The study of the effect that corporations have on society, including the 
sometimes negative impact of certain corporate activities, is not novel. As 
early as the 1930s, Adolph Berle and Edwin Merrick Dodd debated the idea 
that a business might wish to aspire to a higher goal than simply to tum a 
profit. Berle took the position that a corporation owes only a duty to the 
shareholders to maximize wealth, and Dodd suggested that the corporation 
should serve a social purpose as well. 1 Dodd's side of this debate has 
evolved into a concept known as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). 
Sometimes, when people refer to CSR, they are speaking of a broad 
responsibility that a corporation may have to give back to society-to be a 
good corporate citizen. 
At first blush, the lawyer's role in CSR may seem to be a simple one: to 
ensure that the business client complies with the law. But such a blunt 
statement oversimplifies the lawyer's role in the corporate client's decision-
making process. 
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To illustrate this complexity, consider the recent corporate buyout of 
Anheuser-Busch Companies (AB) by lnBev, SA (lnBev). In June of 2008, 
InBev tendered an offer to AB to buy shares at $65 per share.2 This amount 
was not only well above what AB was trading for at the time (thirty percent 
higher than the stock traded in mid-May of 2008),3 but also was more than 
the price at which AB had ever been traded.4 Despite the high bid, 
however, AB 's board refused to accept the offer. 5 AB 's articulated reason 
was that the offer tmdervalued AB's stock.6 It is also possible that AB may 
have refused in part over concerns about the effect that such a buyout might 
have on AB's corporate culture and nonshareholder stakeholders.7 
The local community in St. Louis, Missouri , AB's corporate 
headquarters, was deeply concerned over the effect that a buyout by InBev 
might have.s According to Fortune magazine, AB is one of the most 
admired companies in the United States, ranking number one in the 
beverage industry in all of the considered categories, including people 
management, social responsibility, and quality of management.9 InBev, 
however, is known as a company that is good at cutting expenses to 
strengthen the bottom line, which many feared might mean lost jobs and 
benefits. 1 o AB also is a very large sponsor of numerous athletic events and 
2. Tim Jones, Trouble Is Brewing in St. Louis; Belgian Firm's Bid for Anheuser-Busch 
Taps Deep Hostility in a City Where Beer- Make that Bud- Runs Through the Veins, CHl. 
TRIB. , June 27, 2008, § 1, at I. 
3. !d. 
4. Muralikumar Anantharaman, Anheuser Investors Say $65/Share Would Be Fair Bid, 
REUTERS UK, June 5, 2008, http://uk.reuters.com/article/innovationNews/idUKN053073512 
0080605 (noting that after speculation of a buyout at $65 per share circulated, AB stock rose 
to "an all -time high of $58.56 on June 2"). 
5. Anheuser-Busch to Cut Jobs, Raise Prices in Battle, CHI. TRIB., June 28, 2008, § 2, 
at 3 [hereinafter Anheuser-Busch]; Jones, supra note 2. 
6. Anheuser-Busch, supra note 5; Tom Bawden, Anheuser Takes Legal Action over 
lnBev's Bid, TLMES (London), July 9, 2008, at 43. 
7. Some also speculated that the refusal was based upon considerations of the Busch 
fam ily legacy and the company's history of independence. lnBev Asks Judge for Speedier 
Judgment in Lawsuit Against Anheuser-Bush, S.F. Bus. TIMES, July 9, 2008, 
http: / /eastbay. bizjournals.com/eastbay /stories/2008/07 /07 I dai l y48. html . 
8. Jones, supra note 2; see also Emily C. Dooley, Will Brewer's Philanthropy Go 
Flat?: Williamsburg-Area Groups Hope lnBev Retains Busch Spirit, RICH. TIMES DISPATCH 
(Va.), July 20, 2008, at D l (noting concerns over the effect of a buyout in Virginia 
communities). 
9. Fortune, America's Most Admired Companies 2008: Anheuser-Busch, 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/mostadmired/2008/snapshots/35.html (last visited 
Feb. 21, 2009). The full list of categories includes: innovation; people management; use of 
corporate assets; social responsibility; quality of management; financial soundness; long-
term investment; and quality of products/services. Anheuser-Busch ranked number one in 
all of these categories not only in 2008, but also in 2007 and 2006. See Fortune, America's 
Most Admired Companies 2007: Anheuser-Busch, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/ 
fortune/mostadmired/2007 /snapshots/35.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2009); Fortune, 
America's Most Admired Companies 2006: Anheuser-Busch, http: //money.cnn.com/ 
magazines/fortune/mostadmired/2006/snapshots/l 09.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2009). 
10. Jeremiah McWilliams, Making Bud a Global Brand Holds Key, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, July 15, 2008, at Al (noting that AB would become leaner once InBev applied 
"its trademark cost-cutting"); William Spain, Will Sports Lose One of Its Biggest Boosters? 
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leagues, spending $218 million on sports advertising in 2007 (over $100 
million more than its next competitor, Coors). 11 Though such expenses 
could be justified in terms of marketing and public relations, such a large 
budget would be a likely candidate for reduction by InBev.12 
The refusal by AB's board to accept the offer led to a firestorm of legal 
activity. InBev quickly took actions to begin a hostile takeover, moving to 
remove the current AB board and replace it with a board that was more 
favorable to an InBev buyout. 13 AB instituted its own legal maneuvers, 
accusing InBev of making materially misleading statements about how the 
deal would be financed and seeking to block the buyout attempt under 
federal law, claiming that InBev 's interests in Cuba prohibited it from 
owning and operating AB in the United States. 14 
Obviously, AB 's decision to tum down the offer had legal implications 
that surely required the involvement of legal counsel, both before and after 
the rejection of InBev ' s offer.I 5 Furthermore, AB announced that it was 
going to undertake a series of actions, including offering early retirement to 
a number of employees, to help strengthen its own bottom line as a defense 
to the buyout16-actions that also likely required the assistance of counsel. 
Ultimately, lnBev returned with an offer of $70 per share, an offer that 
proved too good to refuse. AB announced, on July 14, 2008, that it was 
accepting the offer. 17 Legal obstacles may remain, as the buyout could still 
face antitrust obstacles in both the United States and Europe, although this 
seems unlikely. 18 
Whether AB's initial refusal was based upon a pure desire to drive up the 
offer from InBev, or whether stakeholder and corporate culture concerns 
InBev Takeover Spotlights Anheuser-Busch 's Big Ad Budget, MARKETWATCH, July 18, 
2008, http ://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/sportswatch-inbev-takeover-spotlights-anh 
euser-buschs/story.aspx?guid=%7B627 AFDF4-E328-460F-8CE8- 195A5CC2D7BC% 7D&d 
ist=hplatest (stating that an InBev buyout would lead to certain cost-cutting measures). 
11 . Spain, supra note I 0. 
12. Angus Lind, Anheuser-Busch Sale Leaves Sour Taste, Beer Drinkers Say, TIMES-
PICAYUNE (New Orleans), July 21, 2008, http: //b log.nola.com/anguslind/2008/07 /anheuser 
busch_sale_ leaves_sour. html . 
13 . Jones, supra note 2. 
14. Bawden, supra note 6; Gregory J. Corcoran, A Beer Brawl Goes to Court, WALL ST. 
J. , July 9, 2008, at C3. 
15. See Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interdependence of Corporate Lawyers and 
Their Clients, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 507, 512, 543 (1994) (describing the various roles 
attorneys play in corporate takeovers and other corporate transactions). For a nice overview 
of the so-called "Rev ion duty" when takeovers are possible, see Daniel Vinish, Comment, 
The Demise of Clarity in Corporate Takeover Jurisprudence: The Omnicare v. NCS 
Healthcare Anomaly, 2 1 ST. JOHN 'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 311 , 328- 32 (2006). 
16. Anheuser-Busch, supra note 5. 
17. Mike Hughlett, This Bud 's .for Who ? Belgians; Iconic American Brewery Acquired 
for $52 Billion, CHI. TR!B. , July 14, 2008, § I, at I; Dirk Johnson, Anger and Dismay at the 
Sale of a City Treasure, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2008, at Al2 ; Roger Vincent, Budweiser Gets 
a New Nationality; InBev of Belgium Acquires the Owner of 'The King of Beers ' for $52 
Billion, L.A. TIMES, July 15, 2008, at C 1. 
18. Jeremiah McWilliams, Companies Working Out the Details, ST. Lours PosT-
DISPATCH, Aug. 19, 2008, at Dl. 
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played a role as well, is difficult to discern. Regardless, this real-life 
example raises the question of how inextricably intertwined businesses are 
with their legal counsel. If we assume that some businesses do consider 
nonshareholder stakeholders in their decision-making processes, then 
attorneys should also play a role in how those interests are considered. 
~his_ essa~ tackles the overlap between CSR and a lawyer's ethical 
obhgatwns m a democracy. First, we attempt to describe the various 
conceptualizations of CSR-a term that is often nebulous and that has been 
ass~gned multiple meanings by different people. After describing the 
vanous approaches to CSR, we move forward with a tripartite approach, 
suggesting that CSR actually entails three different responsibilities: an 
economic responsibility, a legal responsibility, and an ethical responsibility. 
We then conclude by discussing the lawyer's role in a business 's corporate 
ethical responsibility and how that intersects with the other two 
responsibilities, advocating for a more robust and substantial role by the 
corporate attorney in steering the corporation away from unethical conduct 
that ultimately is not in the corporation's long-term financial interests. 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF CSR 
Before we discuss CSR and its relationship to the attorney's role in a 
democracy, we should clarify what we mean by CSR. In our own research, 
we've discovered that CSR means different things to different people. 19 
For instance, economists, business management academics, legal 
academics, and entities in the European community all have assigned 
varying meanings to CSR. CSR has thus been the topic of vigorous debates 
regarding what responsibilities, if any, a corporation has to society. Some 
hold the view that the only responsibility corporate directors have is to 
make a profit for their shareholders. Milton Friedman is one of the most 
famous proponents of this view, having explained that, in a free economy, 
"there is one and only one social responsibility of business-to use its 
resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as 
it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and 
free competition, without deception or fraud."20 An extreme, anti-Friedman 
19. Colin P. Marks, Jiminy Cricket for the Corporation: Understanding the Corporate 
"Conscience," 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 1129, 1149 (2008); Dirk Matten & Jeremy Moon, 
"Implicit " and "Explicit" CSR: A Conceptual Framework for a Comparative 
Understanding of Corporate Social Responsibility, 33 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 404, 405 (2008) 
(noting that "defining CSR is not easy"); Veronica Besmer, Note, The Legal Character of 
Private Codes of Conduct: More Than Just a Pseudo-Formal Gloss on Corporate Social 
Responsibility, 2 HASTTNGS Bus. L.J. 279, 280 (2006) (noting that CSR means different 
things to different people). 
20. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (2d ed. 1982); see also MILTON 
FRIEDMAN, The Social Responsibility of Business, in THE ESSENCE OF FRIEDMAN 36, 36-38 
(Kurt R. Leube ed., 1987) [hereinafter FRJEDMAN, Social Responsibility]. As Archie Carroll 
points out, this representation of Milton Friedman is a little skewed, as Friedman conceded 
that the responsibility to make a profit was tempered by a duty to "'conform[] to the basic 
rules of [the] society, both those embodied in ... law and those embodied in ethical 
custom[] ."' Archie B. Carroll , The Four Faces of Corporate Citizenship, Bus. & Soc'y 
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approach, then, would argue that corporations, which owe their very 
existence, including such identifYing characteristics as limited liability, to 
society, must therefore also owe a reciprocal duty to nonshareholders.21 
A. Business Management Literature and CSR 
Business management literature provides a good starting point for 
developing a useful definition of CSR, because the subject has been 
explored extensively in a number of articles.22 Generally speaking, the 
business management literature defines CSR as a business's responsibility 
to the wider societal good beyond, but in addition to, the business's 
economic performance.23 Professor Archie Carroll provides an oft-cited 
conceptualization of CSR in business management literature.24 He 
categorizes CSR into four social responsibilities that businesses have to 
society: economic responsibilities, legal responsibilities, ethical 
responsibilities, and discretionary (sometimes called philanthropic) 
responsibilities.25 The first category, economic responsibility, represents 
the basic responsibility of a business to be profitable.26 The second 
category, legal responsibility, represents the responsibility of a business to 
operate within the "framework of legal requirements."27 As Carroll 
explains, "[j]ust as society has sanctioned the economic system by 
permitting business to assume the productive role, as a partial fulfillment of 
the 'social contract,' it has also laid down the ground rules- the laws and 
regulations-under which business is expected to operate."28 The third 
REv., Sept. 1998, at 1, 2 (first alteration in original) (quoting Milton Friedman, A Friedman 
Doctrine-The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIM ES, Sept. 
13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 33). 
21. William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 
CARDOZO L. REv. 261, 264-65 ( 1992) (describing two characterizations of the corporation: 
the first view, whereby the corporation is viewed as the property of the shareholders and the 
second view, in which the corporation is a social institution "tinged with a public purpose"); 
see also Jill E. Fisch, The "Bad Man " Goes to Washington: The Effect of Political Influence 
on Corporate Duty, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 1593, 160 1- 02 (2006). 
22 . As Cynthia Williams has noted, "Legal academics have struggled to produce useful 
definitions of CSR, and in that effort may be well advised to look to the management 
literature." Cynthia A. Williams, A Tale of Two Trajectories, 75 FORDHAM L. R EV. 1629, 
1647 n.54 (2006). 
23. Archie B. Carroll, A Three-Dimensional Conceptual Model of Corporate 
Performance, 4 ACAD. MGMT. R EV. 497, 497- 98 (1979); Matten & Moon, supra note 19, at 
405. 
24. See Aviva Geva, Three Models of Corporate Social Responsibility: 
Interrelationships Between Theory, Research, and Practice, Bus. & Soc'v REv., Spring 
2008, at I , 2 (referring to Carroll 's 1979 article on CSR, supra note 23, as a "foundational 
article on social performance"); Dirk Matten & Andrew Crane, C01porate Citizenship: 
Toward an Extended Theoretical Conceptualization, 30 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 166, 167 (2005) 
(noting that Carroll ' s 1979 model of CSR is widely cited). 
25 . Carroll, supra note 23, at 499; Carroll, supra note 20, at 1- 2; Geva, supra note 24, at 
5- 7; Matten & Crane, supra note 24, at 167. 
26. Carroll , supra note 23, at 500; Matten & Crane, supra note 24, at 167. 
27 . Carroll , supra note 23, at 500. 
28. !d. 
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category, ethical responsibility, represents the "responsibility to do what is 
right, just, and fair."29 Though ethical norms are embodied in both the 
economic and legal responsibilities, the ethical responsibility category is 
meant to embody society's "expectations of business over and above [any] 
legal requirements."30 The final, and perhaps most controversial, category, 
discretionary or philanthropic responsibility, represents society's 
expectation that a business should assume social roles above and beyond its 
economic, legal, and ethical responsibilities.3I Examples of fulfilling a 
philanthropic responsibility could include making contributions to "various 
kinds of social, educational, recreational, or cultural purposes."32 Carroll 
describes activities in this category as including "making philanthropic 
contributions, conducting in-house programs for drug abusers, training the 
hardcore unemployed, or providing day-care centers for working 
mothers."33 Because all of these examples are activities that would not be 
unethical per se if a business did not engage in them, they are thus 
discretionary. 34 
Under Carroll's conceptualization, these categories are not mutually 
exclusive and are ordered by their "fundamental role in the evolution of 
importance."35 One way to visualize this construct is as a pyramid, with 
economic responsibilities at the bottom, topped by legal responsibilities, 
then by ethical responsibilities, and finally, by discretionary responsibilities 
at the very top.36 Other conceptual models have arranged these categories 
into other constructs, such as intersecting circles, where the categories 
overlap to some degree, or concentric circles, with economic 
responsibilities as the core (center) value circle and the other 
responsibilities-legal, ethical, and philanthropic-moving out to ever-
wider circles wrapping around37 the core of economic responsibilities .38 
Of all of the categories, the philanthropic responsibility is often one of 
the most debated among scholars .39 As Carroll acknowledges, it is 
somewhat inaccurate to label something both as discretionary and as a 
responsibility.4° Carroll maintains this category as a part of CSR, however, 
because he views society as expecting businesses to engage in such 
discretionary activities.41 Other commentators disagree on the discretionary 
nature of philanthropic activities and instead place them under the economic 
and ethical responsibilities or as an integral part, rather than a discretionary 
29. Matten & Crane, supra note 24, at I 67. 
30. Carroll, supra note 23, at 500. 
31. !d. 
32. Matten & Crane, supra note 24, at I 67. 
33 . Carroll, supra note 23, at 500. 
34. !d. 
35. !d. at 499- 500. 
36. Geva, supra note 24, at 5 fig. I (a). 
37. !d. 
38. !d. at 5- 6 (summarizing conceptual models). 
39. !d. at 9. 
40. Carroll, supra note 23, at 500. 
41. !d. 
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pari, of CSR.42 Thus, the debate appears to center on whether CSR only 
includes, as its essential parts, the economic, legal, and ethical 
responsibilities, or whether CSR should also include philanthropic 
activities.43 The first view seems consistent with the Friedman view that 
the responsibility of business is to make money, within the limits of the law 
and ethical custom.44 
Friedman himself seems to reject the concept of 
philanthropic/discretionary giving as essentially undemocratic.45 He argues 
that when a corporate executive chooses to spend corporate funds on 
charity, that executive is spending someone else's money- the 
shareholders' money, via their interest in the corporation- for a general 
social interest.46 By spending the shareholders' money, that executive 
essentially imposes a tax either on the customers, through higher prices, or 
on its own employees in the form of lower wages.47 According to 
Friedman, this imposition of taxes and expenditure of proceeds is a 
government function that should be left to the legislature to impose.48 
Carroll's hierarchy does not take this position but simply leaves 
philanthropy as a discretionary, rather than essential, part of CSR. 
This optional view of philanthropic giving contrasts with the second view 
of CSR, which is embodied in a growing trend suggesting that businesses 
have a responsibility beyond their legal and ethical responsibilities.49 As 
one commentator notes, "[p]hilanthropy, which is usually understood as 
exceeding this minimum, appears to serve as the distinguishing point 
between the neoclassical economic position and the new widely accepted 
notion of corporate citizenship, which highlights the importance of 
corporate giving."50 Thus, this newer line of thinking appears to embrace 
discretionary giving as an essential part of CSR that may possibly be 
subsumed under the other responsibilities. 51 
42. See Geva, supra note 24, at 6 tbl.l (explain ing how the intersecting and concentric 
circle models di ffer from Carroll 's pyramid model). 
43 . This concept is sometimes referred to in the business management literature as 
"corporate citizenship" (CC). Matten & Crane, supra note 24, at 168. However, there exist 
various views as to what CC entails, with some commentators fi nding that CC is nothing 
more than a strategic attempt to ensure a stable environment, which in turn will ensure a 
profitable business. !d. Others, such as Carroll , have equated CC with CSR. !d. at 168- 69. 
44. FRIEDMAN, Social Responsibility, supra note 20, at 36- 38; Geva, supra note 24, at 9. 
45 . FRIEDMAN, Social Responsibility, supra note 20, at 38- 39. 
46. !d. at 38. 
47. !d. 
48. !d. at 38- 39. Friedman also appears to take the view that CSR is a very narrow 
category of giving that does not benefit the corporation . Friedman recognizes that a 
corporation may engage i.n chari table giving when it provides an advantageous tax deduction 
and garners good public relations. He is not critical of such practices but notes that it may be 
hypocritical to term such giving "socially responsible." !d. at 4 1. Thus, giving that fa lls 
within one of the other responsibilities of economic, legal, or ethical appears to be acceptable 
corporate behavior in Friedman 's view. 
49. Geva, supra note 24, at 9. 
50. !d. 
51. !d. at 6- 9. 
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B. The EU's CSR Framework 
The European Union (EU) has likewise struggled with the concept of 
CSR. However, the EU provided a starting point for the discussion when 
the European Commission52 issued a "Green Paper" regarding the 
promotion of a European framework for corporate social responsibility in 
2001.53 Beginning in the early 1990s, the European Commission started to 
take an active interest in CSR.54 In March of 2000, the EU's Council of 
Ministers, meeting in Lisbon, made a renewed appeal for businesses to 
adopt a more sustainable approach to CSR. 55 The subsequent "Green 
Paper," which was released in 2001, was the product of the European 
Commission and is officially titled Promoting a European Framework for 
Corporate Social Responsibility. 56 The purpose of the Green Paper was to 
stimulate debate within the European community on how the EU "could 
promote [CSR] at both the European and international leveJ."57 To 
accomplish this objective, the Commission provided a definition of CSR 
and then asked various stakeholders to answer several key questions. 58 
The Green Paper defines CSR as "a concept whereby companies 
integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and 
in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis," and further 
clarifies that "[b ]eing socially responsible means not only fulfilling legal 
expectations, but also going beyond compliance and investing 'more' into 
human capital, the environment and the relations with stakeholders."59 The 
52 . The European Commission is the executive branch of the European Union (EU). It 
drafts proposals for new European laws, implements the EU's policies, runs its programs, 
and spends its funds. See The European Commission, http://europa.eu/institutions/ 
inst/comm/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 21 , 2009). 
53. Jan Wouters & Leen Chane!, Corporate Human Rights Responsibility: A European 
Perspective, 6 Nw. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 262, 273 (2008) ("[T]he real starting point for the 
EU's CSR policy was the issuing of the European Commission' s ... Green Paper on the 
promotion of a European framework for corporate social responsibility . .. . ") . 
54. Sorcha MacLeod, Corporate Social Responsibility Within the European Union 
Framework, 23 WIS. l NT'L L.J. 541, 543--44 (2005). 
55. Comm'n of European Union Cmtys., Commission Green Paper on Promoting a 
European Frameworkfor C01porate Social Responsibility, COM (2001) 366 final (July 18, 
2001) [hereinafter Green Paper 1], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUri 
Serv.do?uri=COM:2001 :0366:FIN:EN:PDF; MacLeod, supra note 54, at 543--44. 
56. Green Paper I , supra note 55; MacLeod, supra note 54, at 543--44; Marisa Anne 
Pagnattaro & Ellen R. Peirce, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Conflict Between U.S. 
Corporate Codes of Conduct and European Privacy and Work Laws, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. 
& LAB. L. 375,406 (2007). 
57. Green Paper I, supra note 55, at 3; see also MacLeod, supra note 54, at 544. 
58. Green Paper I, supra note 55, at 6- 8, 22- 23; see also MacLeod, supra note 54, at 
544. 
59. Green Paper I, supra note 55, at 6. This concern for the stakeholder rather than 
merely the shareholders is consistent with the common European perception that a 
corporation has duties that go beyond its own well-being. See Cynthia A. Williams & John 
M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way? The Erosion of the Anglo-American Shareholder 
Value Construct, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 493,494 (2005) (citing Ruth Y. Aguilera & Gregory 
Jackson, The Cross-National Diversity of Corporate Governance: Dimensions and 
Determinants, 28 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 447 (2003)); Stakeholder Capitalism: Unhappy 
Families, ECONOMIST, Feb. 10, 1996, at 23 (discussing how public companies in Japan and 
2009] THE CORPORATE LAWYER'S ROLE 1277 
Green Paper then goes on to outline the various ways in which a business 
can practice CSR, such as acting responsibly toward its own employees,60 
managing its environmental impact and how it uses natural resources,61 and 
recognizing international human rights.62 The Green Paper then describes 
ways in which companies can implement and report CSR.63 The Green 
Paper also asks how the EU could promote the development of CSR at the 
European and international levels and what the best means are "to develop, 
evaluate and ensure the effectiveness and reliability of corporate social 
responsibility instruments such as codes of conduct, social reporting and 
auditing, social and eco-labels, [and] socially responsible investing."64 The 
Commission received over 250 responses to the 2001 Green Paper from 
business entities, trade unions, civil society organizations, and others, with 
approximately half of the responses coming from the businesses 
themselves. 65 
Of particular interest to our discussion is the definition provided by the 
Green Paper, which seems to confine CSR to only voluntary activities. 
Thus, if we were to reference Carroll's four categories, the Green Paper 
definition would seem to exclude the economic and legal categories from 
CSR as being required and would only consider the ethical and 
philanthropic/discretionary categories as involving CSR. The responses 
in continental European countries generally have a broader vision of the duty of their 
corporate managers, as one that encompasses the interests of other stakeholders, such as 
employees, suppliers, and the communities in which they operate). 
60. Green Paper I, supra note 55, at 8- 9. 
61. Id.at!0- 11. 
62. !d. at 13- 15. 
63. ld. at 16-21. 
64. !d. at 23. The Green Paper also posed to companies the fo llowing questions: 
!d. at 22. 
• What are the driving forces for companies to assume their social 
responsibility? What are the expectations behind such engagements? 
On which areas do these engagements focus? What is the benefit for 
companies? 
• What are the most important best practice ways to implement and 
manage corporate social responsibility? What best practice exists for 
[small and medium enterprises]? 
• How best can we take forward the invitation to business in the 
Commission 's proposal for a sustainable development strategy to publish 
a "triple bottom line" in their annual reports to shareholders that 
measures their performance against economic, environmental and social 
criteria? 
• What are the best ways to build links between the social and 
environmental dimensions of corporate social responsibility? 
• What are the best means to promote further knowledge about the 
business case for corporate social responsibility and its value-added? 
65. Comm'n of European Union Cmtys., Communication from the Commission 
Concerning Corporate Social Responsibility: A Business Contribution to Sustainable 
Development, at 3, COM (2002) 347 final (July 2, 2002) [hereinafter Green Paper II], 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2002:0347:FIN: 
EN:PDF. 
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received to the Green Paper seem to reinforce this perception of what CSR 
entails-as the Commission described in a follow-up communication 
regarding the Green Paper: 
Despite the wide spectrum of approaches to CSR, there is large consensus 
on its main features: 
• CSR is behaviour by businesses over and above legal 
requirements, voluntari ly adopted because businesses deem it to 
be in their long-term interest; 
• CSR is intrinsically linked to the concept of sustainable 
development: businesses need to integrate the economic, social 
and environmental impact in their operations; 
• CSR is not an optional "add-on" to business core activities- but 
about the way in which businesses are managed.66 
This "consensus" provides a somewhat schizophrenic view of CSR. On 
the one hand, it reinforces the concept of CSR as being voluntary in nature, 
which would contrast with the Carroll conceptualization of CSR as 
encompassing legal responsibilities. But the consensus view also 
emphasizes the need for companies to use CSR to create an economically 
sustainable operation, which would seem to be consistent with Carroll's 
view that economic responsibilities are a part of CSR. It may be, therefore, 
that the EU community views legal requirements as a "given," but that it 
views CSR as integrating and balancing the remaining responsibilities-
economic, ethical, and philanthropic- on a voluntary, but in the long-term 
essential, basis.67 
Rather than debating the precise definition of CSR, however, the debate 
within the EU CSR arena has instead focused on voluntary versus 
mandatory CSR. Overwhelmingly, corporations and business entities favor 
making CSR activities and reporting voluntary, but many other 
stakeho lders, such as NGOs and trade unions, desire a more regulated 
framework.68 The European Commission has since released two follow-up 
documents to the 200 1 Green Paper: one in 200269 and another in 2006.70 
Each follow-up expressed a desire to increase communication between 
66. !d. at 5. 
67. Comm'n of the European Cmtys., Communication fi'om the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee: 
Implementing the Partnership for Growth and Jobs: Making Europe a Pole of Excellence on 
Corporate Social Responsibility, at 5, COM (2006) 136 final (Mar. 22, 2006) [hereinafter 
Green Paper Iff] , available at http: //eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do? 
uri=COM:2006:0 136: FIN :EN :PDF ("A common European understanding of what CSR 
means has emerged on the basis of the Commission definition of CSR as a concept whereby 
companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in 
their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis."). 
68. Green Paper II, supra note 65, at 4; MacLeod, supra note 54, at 545 (citing Green 
Paper II, supra note 65, at 4). 
69. Green Paper II, supra note 65. 
70. Green Paper Ill, supra note 67. 
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corporations and stakeholders, as well as to increase transparency in CSR 
initiatives, but neither has adopted a regulatory framework.? ' The 
Commission, however, has encouraged establishing codes of conduct and 
adherence by companies to standards such as the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises. n 
C. Legal Scholarship and CSR 
Legal scholars have similarly struggled with defining CSR. Underlying 
these discussions of CSR is a basic debate over how one should approach 
corporate law, which is framed by two opposing views_73 On the one end 
of the spectrum is the camp that would appear to have a Friedmanesque 
approach to CSR, i.e., that the corporation is in itself a social good and that 
the corporation does good by making money for its shareholders.74 This 
first approach, sometimes referred to as a shareholder primacy nonn, is 
consistent with the property or contract model of the corporation, in which 
the corporation is viewed as the property of the shareholders, and the 
purpose of the corporation is predominantly to increase the shareholders' 
wealth. 75 Though proponents of this view rarely define the view as a form 
of CSR, reflecting back upon Carroll's categories, the shareholder primacy 
norm would seem to be consistent with the economic and legal categories 
7 1. !d. at 6 (promoting a European Alliance for CSR, but noting that that the A lliance is 
not a legal instrument); Green Paper II, supra note 65, at 7 (noting that CSR is "clearly a 
matter for enterprises themselves"); MacLeod, supra note 54, at 546--47 (noting that the 
Green Paper II " refers to frameworks, promotion, assistance, awareness, support, and good 
practice, but there is no indication that formal regulation is a possibility" (citing Green 
Paper II, supra note 65 , at 7)). 
72. Green Paper 111, supra note 67, at 6- 8; see also 0RG. FOR ECON . CO-OPERATION & 
DEY., TH E OECD GUIDELINES FOR M ULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: REVISION 2000 (2000), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/ 1922428.pdf. The Organization for 
Economic Co-operation of Development's (OECD) website summarizes the guidelines as 
follows: 
The Guidelines constitute a set of voluntary recommendations to multinational 
enterprises in all the major areas of business ethics, including employment and 
industrial relations, human rights, environment, information disclosure, combating 
bribery, consumer interests, science and technology, competition, and taxation. 
OECD, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: About, http://www.oecd.org/about/ 
0,334 7,en_2649 _34889 _ 1_1 _ 1_ 1_1 ,OO.html (last visited Feb. 21 , 2009). 
73 . Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in C01porate Law: The Role of Shareholder 
Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 638 (2006). 
74. Allen, supra note 21 , at 265 ; Keith Michael Hearit, Corporate Deception and Fraud: 
The Case for an Ethical Apologia, in TH E DEBATE OYER CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
167, 167-68 (Steve May et al. eds. , 2007); Antonio Vives, Co1porate Social Responsibility: 
The Role of Law and Markets and the Case of Developing Countries, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 
199, 207 (2008). 
75. Allen, supra note 21 , at 264- 65 ; Fisch, supra note 21 , at 1601- 04 (contrasting the 
analogy of the corporation as the Holmesian bad man, which re lies extensively upon a cost-
benefit analysis in its decision making, to the more progressive view of the corporation as 
having obligations to nonshareholder stakeholders); Kent Greenfield, Proposition: Saving 
the World with Corporate Law, 57 EMORY L.J. 948 , 962, 966 (2008); Hearit, supra note 74, 
at 167- 68; Vives, supra note 74, at 207- 08. 
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of CSR- with one caveat: some scholars, such as Frank H. Easterbrook, 
assert that even the legal responsibility is tempered by economic concerns. 
Indeed, in a 1982 article by Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, they urge in 
a footnote that 
managers do not have an ethical duty to obey economic regulatory laws 
just because the laws exist. They must determine the importance of these 
laws. The penalties Congress names for disobedience are a measure of 
how much it wants firms to sacrifice in order to adhere to the rules ; the 
idea of optimal sanctions is based on the supposition that managers not 
only may but also should violate the rules when it is profitable to do so.76 
Although not all proponents of this first approach would agree with 
Easterbrook and Fischel's statement about obeying only important laws, 
that statement nonetheless highlights the importance of the shareholders' 
interests within the shareholder primacy norm. 
The second view is of the corporation as a social institution "tinged with 
a public purpose."77 This approach is concerned with not just the 
shareholders but also the nonshareholder stakeholders-a broad stakeholder 
modei.78 In the stakeholder model, corporations don't have an obligation to 
maximize societal wealth, 79 but they do have a duty to be good corporate 
citizens. 80 This more "progressive view" of corporate law is sometimes 
used interchangeably among legal scholars with the term "CSR."81 
Returning to Carroll's categories, the stakeholder model would seem to 
embrace the ethical and, perhaps, the philanthropic categories of CSR as its 
hallmarks, but like the Green Paper's definition, the model seems also to 
assume legal compliance without contemplating that compliance as a 
category of CSR. 
76. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender 
Offers, 80 MICH. L. REv. 1155, 1177 n.57 (1982) (citing Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. 
Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 
HARV. L. REv. 1161, 1192- 94 (1981); David L. Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social 
Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1979)). As Cynthia Williams has observed, this view 
was rejected in an initial draft of the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate 
Governance as '"premised on a false view of the citizen's duty in a democratic state."' 
Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Compliance with the Law in the Era of Efficiency, 76 N.C. 
L. REV. 1265, 1271-72 (1998) (quoting PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND 
STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 1, 
1982)). 
77. Allen, supra note 21, at 265. 
78. Fisch, supra note 21, at 1601 ; Marks, supra note 19, at 1148; Vives, supra note 74, 
at 207. 
79. Greenfield, supra note 75, at 963. 
80. Fisch, supra note 21, at 160 I; Hearit, supra note 74, at 168 ("In effect, [CSR] . .. 
consists of organizational decisional processes that take into account the values of the wider 
community." (citations omitted)); Vives, supra note 74, at 207. 
81. Engel, supra note 76, at 5- 6 (noting that the term CSR "is most useful if taken to 
denote the obligations and inclinations, if any, of corporations organized for profit, 
voluntarily to pursue social ends that conflict with the presumptive shareholder desire to 
maximize profit"); Fisch, supra note 21, at 160 I; Ami ram Gill, Corporate Governance as 
Social Responsibility: A Research Agenda, 26 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 452, 459-60 (2008). 
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II. CSR: THE LAWYER'S ROLE AND CORPORATE ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITY 
As we see from the above discussion, CSR is not easy to define. For the 
purposes of this essay, however, we've chosen to adopt a framework similar 
to Carroll's categorical approach to CSR, but with some important 
distinctions. First, we've chosen to avoid using the term "category," as that 
term indicates a separation of components, as though each category could 
exist on its own. That view is inconsistent with our own view of CSR. 
Also, though we define CSR as including legal , economic, and ethical 
responsibilities, we exclude any separate philanthropic responsibility. 82 
Finally, rather than a pyramid structure in which certain categories are seen 
as more important than others, we conceptualize each responsibility as 
components that interact with each other in order to create a profitable and 
sustainable business. 
A. A Tripartite Approach to CSR 
The first responsibility that we discuss- economic responsibility- stems 
from the recognjtion that businesses are essentially good for society, 
placing goods and services into the market for consumers at competitive 
prices. 83 It also stems from the recognition that, unless a business is 
profitable, it is not sustainable and thus is incapable of helping society by 
providing further goods or services, by providing jobs to a community, or 
through other methods such as charitable donations.84 We don't mean to 
say, however, that a business's economic responsibility eclipses its other 
responsibilities. As we discuss below, when long-term viability is 
sacrificed for short-term profits, the result is self-destructive and in fact 
counter to the corporation's actual economic responsibility. One way of 
checking to make sure that long-term economic responsibility is being 
satisfied, then, is to balance it with legal and ethical responsibilities. 
The legal responsibility recognizes that society expects corporations, as 
"people" in the legal sense, to be just as bound to the rules as are natural 
people. 85 As Carroll has summarized, businesses exist because society has 
sanctioned their existence, and thus part of this "social contract" is that 
businesses in turn have an obligation to operate within the legal framework 
82. This approach is actually an adoption of a more recent incarnation of Carroll's 
conceptual model that he himself proposed in a co-authored 2003 article. See Mark S. 
Schwartz & Archie B. Carroll , Corporate Social Responsibility: A Three-Domain Approach, 
13 Bus. ETHICS Q. 503 , 508 (2003). 
83 . Carroll , supra note 23, at 500. 
84. Archie B. Carroll, The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility: Toward the 
Moral Management of Organizational Stakeholders, Bus . HORIZONS, July-Aug. 1991 , at 39, 
41 (noting that if the economic responsibility is not met, the other considerations become 
moot). 
85. Over in Europe, the Code of Conduct for European Lawyers was adopted by the 
Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (CCBE) in 1988. It requires lawyers to have a 
duty not just to their clients, but also to the public and the courts. See CCBE CODE OF 
CONDUCT FOR EUROPEA LAWYERS R. 1.1 (2006), available at http ://www.ccbe.eu/file 
admin/user _upload/NTCdocument/2006_code_ enpdf1_1228293 52 7. pdf. 
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that society has created. 86 Taking a formalistic view of the purposes of a 
corporation, one could say that because the broadest statement of corporate 
purpose that can be claimed is to conduct "any lawful business," to conduct 
illegal activity would be ultra vires.87 Considering the bad press, legal fees, 
fines, and loss of stock value that can accompany a corporate scandal, legal 
responsibility is a corporate responsibility if for no other reason than that 
the failure to attend to legal responsibilities can adversely affect the 
corporation's economic responsibilities. But the legal responsibility is 
much more nuanced than mere legal compliance, as it also entails the 
possible avoidance of litigation (which also clearly overlaps with the 
economic and ethical responsibilities) as well as shaping the Jaw through 
lobbying efforts. 88 
Finally, the ethical responsibility component recognizes that 
corporations, just like natural people, should act above bare legal 
obligations.89 This concept is often embodied within "norms [that] have 
been accepted by the organization, the industry, the profession, or society as 
necessary for the proper functioning of business."90 The ethical 
responsibility also recognizes that corporations should act morally, as 
judged by how society views their actions and with a concern for 
nonshareholder stakeholders .9 1 A caveat here: we are not adopting a full-
fledged stakeholder norm by including an overarching, specific ethical 
responsibility within this definition of CSR. We can't: neither of us is 
convinced, for reasons that we discuss below, that there is any way of 
defining an appropriate "ethical" responsibility that would fit all 
corporations. Economic, legal, and ethical responsibilities all interact with 
one another; indeed, any one of these responsibilities, taken alone and to the 
extreme, could demonstrate poor CSR.92 
86. Carroll, supra note 23, at 500. 
87. FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 315 (2000). 
88. The ability of corporations to influence legislatures through lobbying presents a 
rather large ethical question for attorneys representing corporate clients: if some conduct is 
prohibited by law, should the corporation simply lobby to change the law? Jill Fisch has 
suggested that the lawyer's role in representing a politically active corporation requires 
scrutiny of the motives of the corporate directors as well as an analysis of the short- and 
long-term affects of such lobbying efforts. Fisch, supra note 21 , at 1612- 13. Fisch also 
suggests that such lawyers "should faci litate the corporation's evaluation of the effects of its 
political role by increasing transparency and accountability both within and without the 
corporate structure." !d. at 1613. 
89. Carroll, supra note 23, at 500. 
90. Schwartz & Carroll, supra note 82, at 512. Friedman also noted a responsibility to 
operate with legal and eth ical norms. FRIEDMAN, Social Responsibility, supra note 20, at 37. 
9 1. Carroll, supra note 84, at 41. In other words, we believe that, because corporations 
have no single internal voice to view what is moral , they must act in socia lly acceptable 
ways. 
92. Cf John Llewellyn, Regulation: Government, Business, and the Self in the United 
States, in THE DEBATE OVER CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 74, at 177, 179 
("To prosper, organizations need to have success on three distinct performance dimensions : 
the legal, the responsible, and the profitable."). There is also support for this approach in the 
Delaware caselaw, at least in the context of a corporate takeover. In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa 
Petroleum Co., Unocal's board of directors rejected a tender offer that it viewed as grossly 
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We tried to come up with a diagram to illustrate our view that CSR must 
balance these three equally weighted components, and (after rejecting pie 
charts, triangles, and other easy-to-draw diagrams) we came up with the 
image on the following page (the CSR "circle"), with each component a 
necessary part of the whole. 93 
Here 's how that three-part interaction might work. Take, for example, 
the corporation that is so obsessed with creating shareholder wealth that it 
breaks the law and stretches loopholes beyond any intended legitimate use, 
just for the purpose of increasing short-term profits. If such behavior 
reminds you of Enron (or any one of a dozen or more corporate scandals), 
we're not surprised. That 's exactly what Enron did, by-among other 
things-successfully lobbying the SEC to approve mark-to-market 
accounting for Enron 's use and then contorting and manipulating that 
normally legitimate method of accounting in ways that ultimately misled its 
investors.94 
The trick, of course, lies in balancing the ethical responsibilities of CSR 
with the legal and economic responsibilities. Taken to the extreme, a 
corporate director or manager could-while flying the flag of CSR-
improperly use corporate monies to simply help his or her own pet charities, 
inadequate and instead chose to make an exchange offer for its own stock. 493 A.2d 946, 
949- 51 (Del. 1985). In upholding the board's decision, the Delaware Supreme Court stated, 
A further aspect [of the business judgment rule] is the element of balance. If a 
defensive measure is to come within the ambit of the business judgment rule, it 
must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed. This entails an analysis by the 
directors of the nature of the takeover bid and its effect on the corporate enterprise. 
Examples of such concerns may include: inadequacy of the price offered, nature 
and timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact on "constituencies" other 
than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the 
community generally), the risk of nonconsummation, and the quality of securities 
being offered in the exchange. 
/d. at 955 (citation omitted). However, while the Delaware Supreme Court seemed to 
recognize that other constituencies could be taken into account, in a decision later that year, 
the court clarified its statement in Unocal, stating, "A board may have regard for various 
constituencies in discharging its responsibi lities, provided there are rationally related 
benefits accruing to the stockholders." Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdi ngs, 
Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182, 185 (Del. 1986) (citing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955) (concluding that, 
because the corporation was not protecting itself from a hostile takeover, but rather choosing 
between two outside bidders, the rationale for considering outside constituencies was 
inapplicable). Thus, taken together, these opinions could be viewed to support the notion 
that other stakeholders' interests may be considered, so long as they are balanced with, and 
not counter to, the economic benefit of the shareholders. See GEVURTZ, supra note 87, at 3 10 
("In other words, we are evidently back to the notion that one must rationa lize looking out 
for other constituents as ultimately benefitting the shareholders."). 
93. One of NBR's colleagues, Rachel Anderson, had a lovely analogy about the three 
components of CSR. Her analogy sees the corporation through a CSR lens as a sort of 
locomotive, driven by the directors and officers, fuelled by the corporation's economic 
responsibilities, riding on the railroad track of the corporation's eth ical responsibilities, with 
the corporation 's lega l responsibilities keeping the corporation riding on the track instead of 
derailing. Interview with Rachel Anderson, Assistant Professor of Law, William S. Boyd 
Sch. of Law, Univ. ofNev. , Las Vegas, in Las Vegas, Nev. (Nov. 24, 2008). 
94. Marks, supra note 19, at 11 55. 
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with little to no benefit to the economic welfare of the business.95 The 
larger the business, of course, the more owners there are who could be 
adversely affected.96 
So where does the corporation's lawyer come in? Certainly, the chief 
legal officer can, should, and will influence the corporation's legal 
decisions.97 We believe, though, that lawyers should take on more 
responsibility in terms of influencing the corporation's ethical decisions-a 
move that we'd like to encourage.98 
B. CfiR: Corporate Ethical Responsibility and the Bare Minimum 
Let's rule out the idea that CSR includes the requirement that 
corporations must reach certain sky-high ethical standards. For one thing, 
no one could ever agree on what lofty ethical aspirations a given 
corporation should achieve.99 Should it apply the principles espoused by 
95. !d. at 1145. Such decisions would also normally be protected by the business 
judgment rule, so long as a business justification could be made in good faith, such as 
increased publicity and good will for the product. See id. at 1138- 39, 1145-47. 
96. When a business has many shareholders who will be affected, that situation will 
differ significantly from when there's a sole proprietorship where the decision maker is also 
the owner. 
97. Of course, a chief legal officer's ability to influence the conduct of the organization 
will depend on, for example, her ability to have access to the people who have real power 
within that organization. Cf, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, The Discrete Roles of General 
Counsel, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 955 (2005); Sung Hui Kim, The Banality ofFraud: Re-
Situating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983 (2005). 
98. Nothing in any state's ethics rules would prevent a lawyer from giving extralegal-
i.e., ethical- advice. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2007) ("1n 
representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render 
candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other 
considerations such as moral , economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to 
the client 's situation."). 
99. As Rachel Anderson has pointed out, 
What if we view the corporation as an agent of its shareholders? Then, if we 
believe that agents have fiduciary duties to their principals, why would we not 
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the CEO? By the board of directors? By a majority shareholder?100 (And 
don't get us started on other types of business organizations-our thoughts 
about ethical compliance apply to them, too.) Even if a corporation could 
agree on a particular set of ethical principles during a specific period, what 
would happen when the composition of the officers, directors, or majority 
shareholders changed? 
Perhaps, instead of staking out the high ground of ethical aspirations, we 
should settle for staking out the floor of permissible corporate behavior. 
Even though we can't agree on how the "perfectly ethical" corporation 
might behave, we certainly know how the minimally ethical corporation 
should behave. It shouldn't bend the interpretation of laws past the 
breaking point of believability. It shouldn't create Rube-Goldberg-esque 
deals of impenetrable complexity in order to obfuscate a transaction's true 
purpose, especially if that purpose borders on the illegal. In other words, it 
shouldn't try to stay so close to the line between legal and illegal that its 
shadow falls completely on the illegal side of the line. 
The profession has tried setting floors and ceilings before, in other 
circumstances. The American Bar Association's (ABA) Model Code of 
Professional Responsibility devised Canons (general guiding principles), 
Ethical Considerations (aspirational goals), and Disciplinary Rules (floors 
of acceptable conduct).lOI Of these three layers of guidance, only the 
Disciplinary Rules were actually enforceable.I02 
Admittedly, the ABA moved on to the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct, 103 in part because the tripartite formula of Canons, Ethical 
Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules was clunky and somewhat 
confusing. 104 The Model Rules, unlike the Model Code, have a single set 
of principles, which make them easier to understand and enforce. The 
comments to the Rules interpret the Rules and also provide some 
aspirational guidelines as well. I os 
believe that corporations have ethical duties to their shareholders? Going even 
further and taking into consideration the historical development of the modem 
corporation, we might even argue that corporations are, albeit perhaps indirectly, 
agents of society whereby either the state granting the charter of incorporation or 
the society as a whole would be the principal, in which case, corporations would 
arguably have ethical duties to nonshareholder stakeholders as principals via the 
state. 
Comment from Rachel Anderson to authors on an earlier draft of this essay (Nov. 29, 2008) 
(on file with authors). 
I 00. See Fisch, supra note 21, at 1603 ("The corporation cannot readily adopt the moral 
perspective of its individual constituents . ... [V]arious corporate stakeholders may have 
differing moral perspectives."); Marks, supra note 19, at 1149 ("[I]t may not be the case that 
what one corporate manager chooses to do is based on the same 'moral sense' as other 
decisionmakers within the company." (citing Fisch, supra note 21 , at 1603)). 
I 01. See MODEL RULES OF PROF 'L CONDUCT Table of Contents (2007). 
102. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement ( 1983), 
available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/aba/mcpr/MCPR.HTM. 
I 03 . See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Table of Contents (2007). 
104. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preface (2007). 
105. See id. 
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What if we were to enact a Model Code of Ethics for Corporations? 
Individual corporations don't have a problem enacting codes of conduct for 
their employees, I06 although some of them have a devil of a time actually 
following their own codes of conduct.I07 We'll leave a Model Code of 
Ethics for another day (and another article), but even if a corporation 
adopted such a code, the Chief Legal Officer inside the corporation would 
still have to find a way to enforce that code-and there's the rub. 
Everything still comes down to a concept with which lawyers have been 
struggling for eons: what, exactly, are the limits of a lawyer's duty to the 
client? 
In the post-Enron et al. world of corporate scandals, it's clear that many 
of the lawyers involved in those scandals believed that their jobs were to be 
the corporations' hired guns. 108 The businesses wanted to push the 
envelope (or rip the envelope wide open), and the lawyers did their best to 
facilitate what the clients wanted. 109 Many of the deals were legal but bad 
for business in the long run. And some of the deals didn't even pass the 
blush test of being legal, at least in retrospect. 
These lawyers- all of whom are very smart people-were bright enough 
that they could have understood, as an intellectual matter, when they were 
corning close to the ethical line (or crossing over it) at a client's behest. 110 
Lawyers now facilitate deals to the point that complicated deals require 
lawyer involvement. 111 We abandoned the concept of lawyer independence 
106. See, e.g., GOOGLE, INC., CODE OF CONDUCT (2008), available at 
http://investor.google.com/conduct.html; NlKE, INC., CODE OF CONDUCT (2007), available at 
http: //www.nike.com/nikebiz/nikeresponsibility/tools/Nike_Code_of_Conduct.pdf. 
I 07. Recall the recent corporate scandals at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Global Crossing, 
etc. See ENRON AND OTHER CORPORATE FLASCOS: TH E CORPORATE SCANDAL READER 
(Nancy B. Rapoport, Jeffrey D. Van Niel & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter 
ENRON AND OTH ER CORPORATE FIASCOS] (discussing how lawyers were involved in these 
various scandals). In what can only be called the apex of irony, Enron's own corporate code 
of ethics embraced "Respect," " Integrity," "Communication," and "Excellence." See ENRON 
CoRP., CODE OF ETHICS 5 (2000), available at http://www.thesmokinggun.com/graphics/ 
packageart/enron/enron.pdf. Of course, Enron's actual behavior was nothing like the 
behavior described in its code of ethics. 
I 08. In fact, a lawyer is not supposed to be anyone's hired gun. See, e.g., In re Aston-
Nevada Ltd. P'ship, 391 B.R. 84, I 03 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2006) (stating that a lawyer should 
not "succumb to the so-called ' butler-style' of representation, under which the sequaciously 
servi le lawyer does whatever the client wants and then cites that client's command as a 
shield to the improper actions"). Sadly, a lot of lawyers are in prison because they didn 't 
understand these concepts. See, e.g., Michael Kunzelman, Former HMO Executives Get 
Prison Terms in Fraud Case, LAW.COM, Nov. 14, 2008, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp? 
id= l202426014056; Lawyer for Broadcom Co-Founder Enters Guilty Plea in Backdating 
Probe, LAW.COM, Nov. II , 2008, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=l202425928530. 
I 09. See, e.g., Final Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner at 48-55, in re 
Enron Corp., 370 B.R. 583 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 01-16034), available at 
http: // 141.150.158.82/media/Final_Report_Neal_Batson.pdf. 
II 0. Sung Hui Kim does a superb job of discussing the various pressures brought to bear 
on a lawyer's inclination to do the right thing. Kim, supra note 97; see also Andrew M. 
Perlman, Unethical Obedience by Subordinate Attorneys: Lessons from Social Psychology, 
36 HOFSTRA L. REv. 451 (2007). 
Ill. See Painter, supra note 15, passim. 
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(the professional separation of lawyer from client) a long time ago, moving 
instead to "lawyer interdependence,"ll2 as Richard Painter so aptly 
describes the modem practice of corporate law. Modem deals need a 
lawyer 's touch. 11 3 
We think that the move from independence to interdependence has been 
triggered in part by competition and fear. Over the past several decades, the 
cost of running large law firms has increased exponentially. At these types 
of firms, associate salaries have skyrocketed, 114 nonperforming partners 
have been eased out or even thrown out, liS and some business, including 
some legal research work, has been outsourced to other countries, where the 
work can be performed much less expensively. 11 6 The largest firms are 
virtually indistinguishable from each other in terms of pedigree of lawyers, 
quality of work product, and multiplicity of office locations. Therefore, one 
way in which they can compete is by their willingness to yield to their 
clients' demands. In other words, if "Law Firm A" refuses to issue an 
opinion letter or structure a deal the way that BigCorp wants it, "Law Firm 
B" will be happy to steal BigCorp away by finding a way to do what 
BigCorp "needs." This increased competition for clients, in a market with 
some (not yet reached) upper limit on hourly rates, will tempt lawyers to 
talk themselves into compromising their boundaries.l 17 As William Butler 
Yeats has said, "[t]he centre cannot hold." 118 
11 2. See id. 
113. See id. at 538- 53. 
114. See, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, Wal-Mart Refuses Law Firm Fee Hikes, Cites High 
Associate Salaries, A.B.A. J., Nov. 5, 2007, http://abajournal.com/news/wal_mart_refu ses_ 
law_firm_fee_hikes_cites_high_associate_salaries/ . 
115. See, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, Jenner & Block Asks About 10 Partners to Leave, 
A.B.A. J. , Oct. 21 , 2008, http://abajournal.com/news/jenner_block_asks_about_IO 
_partners_to_leave. 
11 6. See, e.g., Arin Greenwood, Manhattan Work at Mumbai Prices, A.B.A. J. , Oct. 
2007, at 36. 
117. Smart lawyers are led astray all the time. See, e.g., MILTO C. REGAN, JR., EAT 
WHAT You KlLL: TH E FALL OF A WALL STREET LAWYER (2004); David B. Wilkins, 
Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. R EV. 
1145 ( 1993). 
11 8. 
Turning and turning in the widening gyre 
The falcon cannot hear the falconer; 
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; 
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world, 
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere 
The ceremony of innocence is drowned; 
The best lack a ll conviction, while the worst 
Are full of passionate intensity. 
Surely some revelation is at hand; 
Surely the Second Coming is at hand. 
The Second Coming! Hardly are those words out 
When a vast image out of Spiritus Mundi 
Troubles my sight: somewhere in sands of the desert 
A shape with lion body and the head of a man, 
A gaze blank and pitiless as the sun, 
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Inside counsel face their own particular pressures. Depending on to 
whom an inside lawyer reports, he or she is likely to face substantial push 
back from the management in the business unit for any naysaying of 
potential business deals. Many within the corporation believe that it's not 
the lawyer's job to tell them "no," but to help them make a deal happen, no 
matter how questionable the deal may be.II 9 Unlike outside counsel, who 
have the chance to diversify their client base, inside counsel have but one 
client. Therefore, strong push back and alienation from the client means, at 
best, a miserable work environment and, at worst, withdrawal (or firing) 
and unemployment.I20 
To make matters worse, inside and outside counsel are humans (all 
lawyer jokes aside); as such, they 're subject to various cognitive errors that 
allow them to talk themselves into making bad decisions. Not only are 
lawyers subject to cognitive dissonance errors (which make them more 
susceptible to subconsciously persuading themselves that it's "right" for 
them to do something that they know is wrong), 121 but they are also subject 
to errors based on social pressure (which makes them more susceptible to 
going along with an obviously incorrect decision if the rest of the group 
also chooses the incorrect decision) 122 and errors based on the idea that 
"someone else" will take care of ferreting out any bad acts (the "bystander 
effect").123 Therefore, as pressure ramps up for lawyers to get deals done, 
Is moving its slow thighs, while all about it 
Reel shadows of the indignant desert birds. 
The darkness drops again; but now I know 
That twenty centuries of stony sleep 
Were vexed to nightmare by a rocking cradle, 
And what rough beast, its hour come round at last, 
Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born? 
WILLIAM BUTLER YEATS, The Second Coming, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF W.B. YEATS 
187, 187 (Richard J. Finneran ed. , 1996). We also like this quote: "A truth that's told with 
bad intent I Beats all the Lies you can invent." WILLIAM BLAKE, Auguries of Innocence, in 
THE COMPLETE WRJTINGS OF WILLIAM BLAKE 431 , 432 (Geoffrey Keynes ed., 1966). 
119. See supra note 97; text accompanying infra notes 121- 23. 
120. At least one of us (NBR), though, has observed that inside counsel usually are more 
risk averse than outside counsel when it comes to ethically risky behavior. At the April 2008 
ABA Business Law Section's meeting in Dallas, Texas, NBR spoke with several high-level 
inside counsel, and each one of them expressed the view that they would prefer that 
members of their companies stayed as far away as possible from taking ethical risks. As one 
of them said during a presentation at that conference, "I would rather [my company 's] 
employees took our Code of Ethics seriously enough that ethics issues never even needed to 
go up to my level. I want them to do the right thing without having to think about it." 
Statement of anonymous participant at American Bar Association Section of Business Law 
Spring Meeting, Dallas, Texas (Apr. 10- 12, 2008). 
121. See, e.g. , Kim, supra note 97, at 992- 1024. 
122. See id. Cynthia Williams has suggested that when Jaw students, professors, and 
attorneys accept the "premise that social welfare will be increased by individuals simply 
pursuing their own self-interest," a view that she associates with the Jaw and economics 
movement, that belief will encourage ethical lapses by lawyers. Williams, supra note 22, at 
1649. 
123. In the famous story of Kitty Genovese, 
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or get the stock price up, or meet analysts' expectations, this set of 
cognitive errors will bear on the lawyers' facilitation of any questionable 
ethical decisions that the corporations may want to make. 
C. How Lawyers Could Set the Tone for Better Corporate Ethical 
Decision Making 
1. Improving the Reporting Structure to Safeguard Corporate Ethical 
Responsibility 
We don 't want to sound too pessimistic about the idea that corporations 
could make better ethical decisions-or about the idea that lawyers could 
play a significant role in such decision making. Both of us believe that 
lawyers could be one source of safeguarding the corporate "conscience." 
(We don ' t, however, want to let the board of directors off the hook for 
safeguarding that conscience.) But if lawyers are to assist in safeguarding 
the corporate conscience, they must become more central to the corporate 
"core" for decision-making purposes. In that regard, we've found one 
approach useful in thinking about how to make lawyers more central. 
In their book Reframing Organizations: Artistry, Choice, and 
Leadership, 124 Lee Bolman and Terry Deal suggest that thorny problems 
are best examined from four different "frames": the structural frame, the 
human resources frame, the political frame, and the symbolic frame. Think 
of the structural frame as the "organizational chart" frame-who reports to 
whom. 125 The human resources frame involves relationships: how people 
feel about where they work and what they're doing. 126 The political frame 
involves knowing the people who know what make things tick (and where 
the bodies are buried). 127 The symbolic frame is the story of the 
organization: its myths and culture. 128 
Using the Bolman-Deal frames, then, we can get a feel for what types of 
access a lawyer would need in order to have some real input into a 
For more than half an hour 38 respectable, law-abiding citizens in Queens 
watched a killer stalk and stab a woman in three separate attacks in Kew Gardens. 
Twice the sound of their voices and the sudden glow of their bedroom lights 
interrupted him and frightened him off. Each time he returned, sought her out and 
stabbed her again. Not one person telephoned the police during the assault; one 
witness called after the woman was dead. 
Martin Gansberg, 37 Who Saw Murder Didn't Call the Police, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1964, at 
I. Some posit that the witnesses didn't call the police because they each assumed that 
someone else would do so. See, e.g., Robert J. Rhee, Corporate Ethics, Agency, and the 
Theory of the Firm, 3 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 309,326 & n.ll6 (2008) (discussing the social 
science research on the Genovese case). 
124. LEE G. BOLMAN & TERRENCE E. DEAL, REFRAMING ORGANIZATIONS: ARTISTRY, 
CHOICE, AND LEADERSHIP (4th ed. 2008). 
125. !d. at 45- 116. 
126. !d. at 117- 64. 
127. !d. at 191- 246. 
128. !d. at 247- 78. 
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corporation's decisions. 129 Structurally, she would have to report to people 
with power- but she would have to have enough power of her own to be 
able to stand up to the business side of the corporation when the business 
side wanted to step over the line, legally or ethically. 130 (Our guess is that 
the Chief Legal Officer would need to have direct access to the board of 
directors, and the board would have to be able to do a good job of 
supervising the company' s actions- an issue which is increasingly in 
doubt. 131) From a human resources frame and from a symbolic frame, the 
Chief Legal Officer would have to be able to set a tone where the business 
people know that the corporation doesn't want them even to come "close to 
the line." And from a political frame, the Chief Legal Officer would need 
to have the ear (and the support) of the key players in order to make sure 
that her opinion as to the merits of proposed decisions carried significant 
weight. 
Without paying attention to each of these four frames, a lawyer's advice 
could easily get lost in the shuffle of everyday corporate life. Reporting 
structures need to solidify a lawyer's ability to give advice. Without giving 
a lawyer the power structure to make sure her advice gets real 
consideration, the miscreant corporation (and the corporation focused only 
on short-term gains) will be able to marginalize the lawyer's advice. Even a 
good corporation with well-meaning officers and directors will push back 
on legal advice from time to time. The question is not whether officers and 
directors will push back. The question is what the lawyer can do about the 
anticipated push back. How can the lawyer help the corporation stay on the 
right side of the law? 
There are always line-drawing problems when it comes to giving legal 
advice. For one thing, a client may want to "test" the line or urge that the 
line be moved in some way. 132 For another thing, the line may not be well-
129. As Rachel Anderson points out, it's the difference between "whether the lawyer is 
functioning as a scribe (servant) or an advisor (counselor)." Comment from Rachel 
Anderson to authors, supra note 99. 
130. See, e.g., 15 U.S .C. § 7245 (2006). Standing up to one's organization can be a 
career-limiting move, cf Fred C. Zacharias, Coercing Clients: Can Lawyer Gatekeeper 
Rules Work?, 47 B.C. L. REv. 455, 466 (2006) ("Threatening disclosure, for example, may 
enhance a lawyer's immediate position or power in an organization, but in the long run may 
cause the organization to confide in, and depend on, the lawyer less frequently or to a lesser 
extent."), but standing up to the client is part of the lawyer's job. The hard part is overriding 
the lawyer 's temptation to persuade herself that she doesn't need to stand up to the client- in 
other words, overriding the lawyer's tendency to talk herself into believing that what the 
client wants to do is the right thing to do, see supra notes 119- 23 and accompanying text. 
131. Jonathan Macey makes a persuasive argument that boards of directors aren't 
particularly good at ensuring good corporate governance. See generally JONATHAN R. 
MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN (2008). If that is 
true, and we think that it is, then having access to the board of directors, in and of itself, 
won't do much to improve a corporation's ethical responsibility. 
132. Lawyers are entitled to argue for a good faith change in the law. See MODEL RULES 
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2007) ("A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or 
assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is 
not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or 
reversal of existing law."). 
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defined at all when the client wants to take a particular action. And, of 
course, some clients (and some lawyers) couldn't even locate the line 
between right and wrong with a map and a divining rod. For this last group 
(those who couldn't find the line if it were directly in front of them and 
labeled "LINE IS HERE"), we propose a bright-line test for legal advice: if 
the advice uses the word "technically" in order to be accurate, then that 
advice is far too close to the line for comfort. So, for example, if an opinion 
letter suggests that a transaction will comply with the relevant regulations 
only if the words are read out of context and counter to the purpose of the 
regulations, that opinion letter likely will have some variant of the word 
"technically" in it, and it is too close to the line. 
Bob Gordon, during this Symposium, pointed out that lawyers' training 
pushes them in the direction of softening any lines that might exist, either 
by construing the "line" to allow the desired behavior or by lobbying for (or 
assisting the lobby in) changing the line to permit the desired behavior.l33 
After all, the downside risk of the client getting caught for misbehavior is 
not particularly large, and the upside risk is that the client gets what it 
wants. 134 
2. Fine-Tuning the Incentives for Corporate Ethical Responsibility 
Even without the Bolman-Deal frames analysis, one important factor in 
shaping behavior is the use of incentives. Organizations reinforce decisions 
by rewarding certain kinds of decisions and punishing others. Some of 
those incentives will lead to appropriate-and even innovative-behavior; 
others, unfortunately, will lead to dysfunctional behavior. For example, 
Enron rewarded the decisions of electricity traders to ship power out of 
California, only to import power in at higher prices later, by giving the 
traders large bonuses and significant power during the semi-annual 
performance reviews (known around Enron as "rank and yank.") l35 Jeff 
Skilling's appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit hinged in 
part on his argument that his decisions at Enron were tailored to fit Enron's 
133. See, e.g., Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating 
Schemas of Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103 MICH. L. REv. I, 146 (2004) ("In other 
words, Friedman, given his view of markets, ultimately concedes that managers have no 
choice but to maximize profits. A manager is not 'free to choose' social responsibility, or at 
least not more than once. The situation of markets eliminates that freedom."). 
134. Or, to be more precise, the officer or director of the corporate client gets what he 
wants, such as excessive compensation or bonuses that don ' t relate to performance. The 
officer or director has "IBG, YBG" ("I'll be gone, you'll be gone") in the back of hi s mind, 
especially given the frequency of job-hopping among executives. For example, Robert 
Nardelli fled to Chrysler after eviscerating Home Depot. See, e.g., Nick Bunkley & 
Micheline Maynard, Chrysler Looks Outside to Turn Its Fortunes Around, lNT'L HERALD 
TRlB., Aug. 7, 2007, at I. 
135. Cf Tom Fowler, Enron 's Implosion Was Anything but Sudden, Hous. CHRON., Dec. 
20, 2005, http ://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/special/enron/2655409.html . 
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goals and not to steal from Enron in any way. 136 The old saying of 
"garbage in, garbage out" works as well for corporate behavior as it does 
for computer programming. 
If we could get the "garbage" out of corporate decision making, perhaps 
we could come up with a reasonable code of conduct-one that sets forth 
minimally acceptable ethical behavior. Assuming that the Chief Legal 
Officer had the status and power to enforce that code, 137 what would such a 
code look like? For one thing, the code would stress that no one, from the 
highest-ranking employee on down, would come even close to the line 
(ethically or legally).138 For another, the corporation would enforce the 
code consistently: no exceptions for key players (or anyone else ). 139 And 
the enforcement would be public, so that all of the employees would 
understand what happened when someone played too close to the line. Just 
as important, employees who made ethically good choices would receive 
public rewards. An organization's culture is formed by both positive and 
negative reinforcement. 
Few corporations, though, could achieve this ideal world. The less-than-
ideal world-the one in which we live-poses the classic problem: How do 
we draw the line between "normal" aggressive and creative lawyering that 
benefits the corporation from lawyering that facilitates unethical behavior 
by the corporation? How do we keep the corporation from justifying 
virtually any behavior by arguing that the behavior is necessary to increase 
shareholder value? Given current corporate law, how do we convince a 
board of directors that valuing stakeholder interests is consistent with 
shareholder value? 
CONCLUSION 
It's possible that no viable structure and no fine-tuned incentives could 
help corporations or their lawyers locate the line between right and wrong. 
After all, lawyers are as human as anyone else, and humans have an 
136. See Kristen Hays, Focus on 'Honest Services ': Pros, Cons of Argument Take Center 
Stage in Skilling's Appeal, Hous. CHRON., Apr. 3, 2008, at I, available at 
http: //www .chron.com/ disp/story .mpllspecial/enron/5 670281.html. 
137. We know, we know: it's like "assum[ing] a can opener." In an earlier article, one of 
us explained that reference this way: 
Here's the version that I know: A mathematician, an engineer, and an economist 
are stranded on a desert island with only one can of food and no can opener. The 
mathematician writes all sorts of complex formulas in the sand in an attempt to 
discover one that will open the can, but none of the formulas leads to anything. 
The engineer tries to build a can-opening machine out of the stones and grass on 
the island, but the machine isn't strong enough to open the can. In despair, the 
mathematician and the engineer tum to the economist, who's grinning proudly. 
"No problem," says the economist. "We can open the can easily. Just assume a 
can-opener." 
Nancy B. Rapoport, Our House, Our Rules: The Need for a Uniform Code of Bankruptcy 
Ethics, 6 AM. BANKR. lNST. L. REv. 45, 96 n.242 (1998). 
138. But see text accompanying supra note 132. 
139. Thanks to Rachel Anderson for pointing out this "no exceptions" concept. 
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uncanny ability to talk themselves into thinking that "wrong" is "right." On 
the other hand, to the extent that any type of structure or incentives could 
help the well-meaning lawyer do the right thing, an expanded role of the 
corporation's duties might clarify some questionable issues for a 
corporation's lawyer. If the purpose of a corporation is not only to provide 
short-term financial benefits to the shareholders but is also to improve the 
corporation's long-term health by adding issues of legal propriety and 
ethical norms to the corporation's economic interests, then perhaps caselaw 
will develop over time that supports decision making that takes these other 
interests into account. 
Short-term thinking was part of what caused Enron and other corporate 
scandals of its time, as well as the current fmancial free fall.l 40 The 
decisions that corporations make- including the decisions to change the 
law or break the law for financial gain-have ripple effects that go beyond 
the business world. Those consumers today whose houses are worth less 
than the amount they owe on their mortgages, or who have been laid off 
because their companies' financial prospects are failing, or who have seen 
the value of their retirement funds vanish almost overnight-all of these 
people-suffer from the ripple effects of bad corporate decision making. In 
tum, we all suffer when Congress makes ill-calibrated, knee-jerk reactions 
to these corporate scandals. Not only are the "causes" of problems not 
fixed, but the "fixes" cause yet more problems. Perhaps, just perhaps, 
lawyers could help prevent the next round of corporate scandals by being 
willing to say no to bad ideas and bad decisions. Perhaps lawyers could 
become not just the guardians of corporate legal responsibility, but of 
corporate ethical responsibility as well. 
140. See generally ENRON AND OTHER CORPORATE FIASCOS, supra note 107. 
